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Abstract
Transitional justice is a society’s response to a legacy of large scale past human rights violations that seeks to ensure accountability, provide recognition for victims, and achieve reconciliation. Transitional justice mechanisms attempted in the West Balkan region at various times have included trials in local courts, specialised chambers, international tribunal, lustration and reparations. No successful truth commission has been established in the region. The end of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)’s mandate in the region opens up possibilities for a truth commission. International criminal justice has its limits and is only one component of a holistic approach which should be employed as a targeted strategy of transitional justice. While truth commissions have exercised jurisdiction over abuses within their national territory, no truth commission has ever exercised its jurisdiction across several independent countries within a region. This brings into question the feasibility of a regional truth commission in the West Balkans which, although innovative and historically unprecedented, is greatly challenging given the current political circumstances in the region. This article examines the prospects and potential advantages of such a regional truth-seeking mechanism and evaluates how developments in the ICTY would affect the prospects for such a regional truth-seeking mechanism.





Transitional justice is a society’s response to a legacy of large scale past human rights violations 
that seeks to ensure accountability, provide recognition for victims, and achieve reconciliation. It includes both retributive and restorative justice mechanisms aimed at dealing with a past of serious human rights violations. Retributive justice seeks to hold perpetrators of past abuses accountable through the criminal justice system by meting out appropriate punishment. It largely focuses on the offence and the offender and employs mechanisms such as local, national or international civil and/or criminal trials.  On the other hand, restorative justice places the victims at the centre of its processes and seeks to repair the harm between offenders and victims or between offenders and the wider community. It therefore aims to restore the dignity of the victims and to restore or reintegrate the perpetrators back into the community. Mechanisms which can be used in the process include Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, amnesty, vetting, lustration, reparation, reconciliation, institutional reform and memorialisation (Binder 2013). As a result of the predominate role of external actors, transitional justice in the West Balkans has been seen as “justice from the outside in” (Olsen et al. 2010:201) which has overwhelmingly focused on judicial and criminal justice-seeking mechanisms (Bieber, Galijaš and Archer 2014). 

	Transitional justice mechanisms attempted in many states in the region at various times have included trials in local courts,​[1]​ specialised chambers, international tribunals, lustration​[2]​, and reparations (Documenta et al. 2006). No successful truth commission has been established in the region. The fear then was that it could interfere with the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), overlap with its investigative functions, and undermine its decisions (Djokić and Ker-Lindsay 2010:202). The end of the ICTY’s mandate in the region opens up possibilities for a truth commission, considering that the ICTY is only one component of a holistic approach which should be employed as a targeted strategy of transitional justice. Further, an important point to consider in any evaluation of the ICTY is a conscious acknowledgement of the limits of international criminal justice in addressing the legacies of war and repression. The establishment of a regional truth commission could complement ICTY in the transitional justice process in the region. Truth commissions are generally “bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country - which can include violations by the military or other government forces or armed opposition forces” (Hayner 1994:558). Characteristically, they are temporary bodies empowered by the state to focus on past events and investigate a pattern of abuses over a set period of time (Hayner 2001:14).
	While truth commissions have exercised jurisdiction over abuses within their national territory, no truth commission has ever exercised its jurisdiction across several independent countries within a region. This brings into question the feasibility of a regional truth commission in the West Balkans which, although innovative and historically unprecedented, is greatly challenging given the current political circumstances in the region. 
	This article addresses three main issues. Firstly, the prospect for a regional truth commission in the West Balkans is analysed. Thereafter it examines the potential advantages as well as disadvantages of such a regional mechanism in support of the transitional justice process in the region. Lastly, this article will evaluate how the recent developments in the ICTY would 
affect prospects for such a regional truth-seeking mechanism. This article does not set out to claim that a regional truth commission is a panacea for all the unresolved post-conflict issues in the West Balkans. Rather, just like prosecution, it is only one aspect of a multifaceted approach needed to secure enduring peace.

Brief Background
The conflict in the West Balkans started as early as 1989, affected Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and resulted in a war in Kosovo. During the currency of this conflict, the serious differences between the Croats, Muslims and Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina led to war in 1992, which all seemed to come to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. After the end of the war it was time to address the legacies of this conflict, which had culminated in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia into new independent sovereign states, as well as to hold criminally accountable perpetrators of international crimes during the conflict. The international community responded through the establishment of the ICTY (Statute of the ICTY 1993) by the Security Council whose primary objective was to bring about criminal accountability in the Balkans. Whether or not the ICTY was successful in achieving this has been a subject of controversy (Meernik 2003; Mertus 2004; Hazan 2006) and is not the main focus of this paper. However, such a mechanism alone cannot sufficiently address in totality the legacies of the past. A transitional justice process which focuses only on one or another mechanism or ignores civil society or victims will be ineffective (UN Secretary General Report August 2004). 	
	Over the last few decades post-conflict societies have increasingly employed truth and reconciliation commissions in the transitional justice process, either as complementary to or as an alternative to criminal prosecution. Most, like the South African TRC, were governmental bodies; some were established by executive decree (Chile) (Rotberg and Thompson 2000:13), a few under the United Nations mandate (El Salvador and Tomor-Leste), and others by international (Rwanda) or domestic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Brazil) (Sarkin and Daly 2004:723). Each has scored varying degrees of successes and failures. Their popularity has developed through a perception that truth commissions can serve a number of purposes beyond the reach of retributive mechanisms (Stahn 2001:954). 
	After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995 and following the defeat of Milosevic, his successor Vojislav Kostunica established by decree a Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a mandate to investigate war crimes perpetuated in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Apart from the lack of political will, funding, and civil society support, this commission failed because its mandate cut across the multiple newly independent states. One reason it failed was because it was a national commission which attempted to investigate a region-wide conflict. 
	Most of transitional justice literature has predominantly focused on prosecution and truth commissions and how they can best serve justice in post-conflict societies. The dichotomy between peace versus justice and truth versus justice debates has constituted a central part of the literature on transnational justice (Thoms et al 2008:18-19; Biggar 2001; Baker 2001). 
Proponents of the legal approach emphasize the deterrent value of criminal prosecution and its ability to break the cycle of violence (Minow 1998; Bell 2000). While criminal prosecution can cool the fervour of collective vengeance by separating individual from collective guilt, it is not an effective mechanism to reconcile trauma and establish collective memory (Carla De Ycaza 2010:9-28). As such, over-reliance on it should be treated with much wariness. As pointed out by Stover and Weinstein, there is a dichotomy between the international community’s aspiration for justice and how its application was perceived by those affected in the West Balkans (Kerr 2007:379).
	On the other hand, advocates of the truth versus justice debate promote truth commissions as alternatives to prosecution.  It is argued that truth commissions can help defeat cultures of denial, provide redress for victims, and contribute to individual and social healing and reconciliation (Hayne 2001). They are more effective when combined with other transitional justice mechanisms. Kim and Sikkink in their empirical study found that truth commissions help decrease repression and have a positive effect on human rights protection in post-conflict societies (2010:939-963). However, when applied in isolation truth commissions have been found to have a negative impact on democracy and human rights in post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts (Olsen et al. 2010).
	As the discourse has moved on, a holistic approach is needed by societies recovering from violent conflict or oppression, as opposed to an exclusive focus on criminal prosecution and/or truth commissions. A holistic approach will embody both retributive and restorative approaches which will address different levels and dimensions of truth and justice including accountability, truth recovery, reparations, institutional reform and reconciliation (Boraine 2006:19-25). This approach was not employed in the West Balkans and the processes which have been employed in many of the former Yugoslav states have mostly been experimental. 
	Moreover, feminist discourse provides insights into the need to move beyond punitive justice when dealing with gender-based violence. Systematic rape of women as part of the warfare in the region and beyond has been documented (Kohn 1995; Allen 1996). Several scholars have questioned the appropriateness of tribunals when dealing with gender-based violence due to the negative impact of such an adversarial process upon victims (Mertus 2004; O’ Connell 2005) and argue for truth commissions as a better alternative.​[3]​ The extent to which any regional commission in the region will address this need will contribute to its success in the region.
	The initiative for a regional truth commission is an innovation which could overcome some of the challenges which any national commission will face and complement the other transitional justice processes in the region. However, such an initiative cannot successfully take off and create deep impact without the active political support of the official political institutions in the region. It is better not to establish a truth commission than to have a badly designed and implemented one (Hayner 2001). The Yugoslav Truth Commission illustrates the dangers of a badly conceived and implemented truth commission.​[4]​ 


Prospects of a Regional Truth Commission in the Balkans
Despite the many challenges which the initiative faces, the prospects for establishing a regional truth commission in the Balkans are increasing as the initiative attempts to win support and overcome the political and structural obstacles.
	The failure to successfully establish a national truth commission to investigate the past violations of the Yugoslav war has played to the advantage of a regional truth-seeking mechanism in the region. On 29th March 2001, Vojislav Kostunica established a national truth commission. The composition of this commission, which bore no regional representation and some of whose commissioners had links with the former regime, was described by Jelena Pejić as a “[s]haky start” (Pejić 2001). It died in 2003 without developing any teeth, having produced nothing valuable, not even a single hearing. Croatia also experienced a similarly unproductive commission shortly after Ivica Racan’s government acquired power. In 1997, Bosnia established a national truth commission which yielded only periodic round table conversations and discussions (Heil 2000). Even the Srebrenica Commission whose 2004 report concluded that grave crimes had been perpetrated in the region in 1994 was viewed with immense scepticism by the local population (Simic and Volcic 2012), and the impartiality of the commission as well as the validity of its report have been greatly questioned (B92 April 2002). These have made many states in the region unwilling to develop a state-owned initiative which would most likely be contested by the other states in the region as an accurate record of the past violations. The idea of a regional truth commission becomes a more likely alternative since it gives each national group the opportunity to participate in determining the truth about the conflict in the region. 
	Establishing a regional truth commission will raise a number of issues. Should it be a top-down or bottom-up approach and what should be the level of involvement of political elites, institutions and civil society? And also what should the function of the regional truth commission be?
	Top-down and bottom-up restorative mechanisms both have strengths and weaknesses. According to Ruth-Heffelbower (1991) and Van Ness (1990), top-down restorative justice mechanisms can bring order but only bottom-up institutions can bring peace. The choice of approach will as such be determined by whether it seeks to establish order or to bring peace and reconciliation. Top-down schemes mostly fail because they remove individuals from a sense of local ownership when addressing their past and fail to sufficiently take into account local customs and practices (McEvoy and McGregor 2008:28). The prospects of any regional truth commission in the Balkans coming to fruition lie in the initiative of the Coalition for a Regional Commission (RECOM). This is a grass roots initiative which in the view of Teitel very much agrees with the contemporary vision of transitional justice as an appropriate form of post-conflict intervention (2008). This regional process was launched in 2005 by the Humanitarian Law Centre in Serbia, Documenta in Croatia and the Research and Documentation Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was formed with the belief that mutual understanding of the abuses which took place during the wars could only be reached by a regional truth-seeking approach. Rosalind Shaw has recommended that before a truth commission is “initiated in a particular setting, it is essential to establish whether such an exercise would have popular support—not just among local political leaders and NGOs, but also, and crucially, among ordinary survivors” (Shaw 2005:12). 
	A wide consultation process is vital to the establishment of a truth commission. The wide consultation process undertaken before establishing the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was unprecedented (Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 2000:32), involving a whole year of debate, two major international conferences, and a public process for the selection of Commissioners (Hayner 2001:216). However, a major criticism that was made against this consultation process was the absence of inputs from victim organisations (Garkawe 2003:34-35). A regional truth commission would require a far wider and broader consultation. RECOM has carried out consultation and sought the support of victims, war veterans, victims’ family members, civil societies, victim association non-majority communities, and law professionals in the region and many other local, national and regional groups (RECOM Consultation Process 2013). But the consultation process and constitution of RECOM still need to satisfy a regional standard of inclusivity, most especially with victims’ organizations, and to engage more with experts from academia and other conflict regions. RECOM for example was not successful in attracting victims’ organisations and war veterans’ organisations in Bosnia (Fischer and Petrović-Ziemer 2013:78). While RECOM’s membership grew from 100 organisations to 342 within four years (2008-2011), the membership is more an expression of support than a commitment to the process for a regional commission (Simić and Volčič 2013:223). The coalition membership has currently dropped to 132.​[5]​ Unlike the case of South Africa which was a government-led consultation process, RECOM is an NGO-led consultation process. It therefore needs to secure greater engagement of the state governments in the region and not merely individual political leaders.
	As a regional initiative, it risks being a failed attempt if it does not manage to gain the political support of all the states in the West Balkans. As Lutz has stated, “the lesson seems to be that civil society can keep the issue of accountability alive, but it takes a certain level of government will to decisively move forward...” (2006:338). Hence involvement of political elites, institutions and civil society is crucial to the prospects of a regional truth commission in the Balkans. The RECOM initiative for a regional truth commission appears to have won the support of the Presidents of Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovenia and the European Parliament as well as many foreign diplomats and state representatives (RECOM Initiative Voice 2011:19). But these statements of political support need to be transformed into real action to bring this initiative to reality. More so, the fact that Bosnia and Serbia have not recognised the independence of Kosovo till today is an organisational obstacle. This is a serious structural impediment which points to the fact that such a regional commission may be premature in the present circumstances.
	Despite the fact that the RECOM initiative for a regional truth commission is innovative and challenges the top-down transitional justice approach, which has largely been employed in the region, there are formidable challenges even with the proposed draft statute of the regional commission. In the first place, the broad objectives in the RECOM statute seem too ambitious to be achieved within the limited period of three years (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 
6 (1)). The objectives stated in the draft statute include: establish facts about war crimes and gross human rights violations, acknowledge injustice inflicted upon victims, contribute to the fulfilment of victims’ rights, help parties to accept the facts about war crimes and gross violations of human rights, clarify the fate of missing persons, and prevent the reoccurrence of the past (ibid). Conducting an investigation across national boundaries for abuses that took place within a 10-year period and with such a broad mandate requires more time to accomplish a detailed record. 
	Secondly, the financial arrangements for a regional truth commission in the draft statute may also prove not to be ideal. If RECOM is to be financed exclusively by state parties (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 42 (1)) then it risks running into problems if the states in the region fail to cooperate with the commission and to respect their financial obligations towards it. Exclusive reliance on the states for financial support does not remove the risk of the states thwarting or undermining the initiative to serve their political ends (Grodsky 2009; Lamont 2010). The case of Sri Lanka, where the Commission effectively endorsed the government’s one-sided version of truth, is illustrative (Weiss 2012:240). RECOM has showed interest in overcoming this weakness by accepting amendment to the existing funding arrangement to include domestic and foreign donations and funds from international organizations (RECOM Initiative Voice 20 February 2015:5).
	Moreover, the RECOM proposed statute does not pay specific attention to addressing gender-based crimes. Very rarely have transitional justice processes systematically taken into account the victimised position of women in post-conflict societies. RECOM will be more effective in serving its purpose if it can specifically consider the victimised position of women in its attempt to contribute to the transitional justice process in the region and in rebuilding the post-conflict region. 
	In addition, the proposed RECOM statute is victim-centred but a realistic expectation of what RECOM can do must be painted in the minds of victims. Previous experiences have shown that victim expectation can have great impact on the work of a truth commission. For example, in Sierra Leone, victims' unmet expectation that they would receive financial and material benefits from their country’s truth and reconciliation commission adversely impacted its legacy (Miller 2010:491). While some victims may want to know the whereabouts of their loved ones, some may want reparations for the abuses they or their family suffered during the conflict. It still remains questionable the extent to which a regional truth commission would satisfy the different needs and demands of the victims. Article 14 (f) of the proposed RECOM statute addresses the financial expectations of victims by recommending to the state parties the appropriate form of reparation. Nevertheless, victims should be discouraged from associating their participation with reparation or other financial redress because it is still at the discretion of the state party whether or not to accept and implement such recommendations. Failure of the state to do so would only leave the victims frustrated. A 2008 overall assessment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that “the most pressing concern and frustration among survivors have been the failure of the government to implement the TRC recommendations on reparations” (Hayner 2010:177).
	One cannot also disregard the adverse contributions of strong criticisms which have come from the media and other sources on the prospects of the RECOM initiative. If a successful regional truth commission is to be established in this region, it needs to win the support of the media. Most of the criticism against the RECOM Initiative has been negligently labelled by its advocates as “ad hominem attacks” (Mekina 2011). Ristivojevic questions the competence and objective of RECOM (2011). He argues that the objectives and intended modus operandi of RECOM is in violation of Articles 32 and 194 of the Serbian Constitution, and also criticises its attempt to usurp judicial powers in Serbia.  Ristivojevic in another article criticises the evidence procedure of RECOM and submits that it extorts evidence from witnesses in manner similar to the “proceedings conducted before the notorious judicial institutions of the Roman Catholic Church – namely, the Inquisition” (Ristivojevic 2011). However, Ristivojevic’s criticisms stemmed from a faulty premise. He most probably mistook truth commission for a Court. The fact that truth commissions establish facts about events does not imply that they possess the full judicial powers which the courts exercise. 
	The leadership of the RECOM initiative has also come under attack. Slavisa Dukic, President of the Association of Prisoners in Republika Srpska, called upon all former Serb prisoners and citizens to reject the RECOM initiative because Natasa Kandic, a prominent anti-Serb, was behind the project (Ristivojevic 2011). Similar calls also came from the association of families of imprisoned and killed soldiers and missing civilians of Republika Srpska. Dragon Popovi from Civic Initiative published an article entitled “RECOM is doomed to fail” (Popovi 2011). Hrvoje Hitrec from Croatia considers RECOM Initiative a “Conspiracy against the Croatian People” (Hitrec 2010:5).
	Whether or not a Regional Truth Commission can be established and made to be more successful than earlier attempts will depend on the ability of the initiative to break the political barriers and secure the involvement of official political and governmental institutions in the region. Lutz, in commenting on the Peru Truth Commission, stated that the huge political and popular support won by the commission made it “politically costly to oppose it or to appear to be obstructing its tasks” (2006:337). The wide consultation, international support, and the hundreds of various types of victims, civil society and professional associations that have been engaged in the process constitute a positive step made appealing by the sense of local ownership. The Petition for RECOM by 2011 had been signed by 543,000 individuals from across post-Yugoslav society and has over 1,900 civil society organisations across all the regions campaigning for a regional truth commission. 

Advantages of a Regional Truth Commission in the West Balkans
The earlier discussions have analysed the prospects of a regional truth-seeking mechanism in the West Balkans and the difficulties it encounters in the process of being realised. It is therefore necessary to look into the potential advantages which such a regional truth-seeking mechanism may offer the people and states in the West Balkans.

Building a Historical Record and Establishing the Truth
Historical records in the West Balkans, which are multiple, contradictory, and mutually exclusive, have been frequently employed as political instruments of alienation and injustice (Subotic 2013:269). There are conflicting notions of memory. The Serbs mostly remember their victimization solidified by the 1999 NATO intervention; Croatian memory of the past is that they were not the aggressor but fought a just, legitimate and defensive war; Bosnian political elites have tried to maintain the narrative of Bosnia as a state victim of genocide (Subotic 2013:269-276). A regional truth commission will mediate between different memories and interpretations of the past atrocities in the West Balkans. RECOM hopes to achieve this by researching the political and societal circumstances that decisively contributed to the outbreak of wars (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 14 (d)). Publication of the final report of such a regional commission will greatly inform historians in the construction of the history of the region. Michael Ignatieff once said, “The past is an argument and the function of truth Commissions, like the functions of honest historians, is simply to purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies” (Ignatieff 1996:113). If a truth Commission possesses this power, then it is particularly needed in this region due to the existence of several and conflicting versions of the truth of the past abuses. Kritz cited a Bosnia Leader of a war crimes commission who stated in a meeting with Croats and Serbs “that he and his colleague are in the process of creating three conflicting versions of the truth, and if we keep going along this path, fifty years from now our grandchildren will fight again over which one is correct” (Kritz 2004:22). 
	To avoid Croatian, Serbian and Muslim versions of the truth which may be a potential seed for future conflict, it is necessary to uncover the truth about the war. For example many Serbs had denied the Srebrenica massacre of August 1995. Like Cohen noted, “This literal denial was not necessary due to lack of knowledge of facts” but has eventually given way for an interpretive denial (Cohen 2001:108). An example of this is the controversial “Declaration on Srebrenica” adopted by the Serbian Parliament in 2010 which acknowledged the massacre at Srebrenica but never mentioned the term “genocide.” This was further supported by President Tomislav Nicolic's assertion that “There was no genocide in Srebrenica” but only “grave war crimes,” contrary to the findings of the ICTY (BBC News Europe June 2012). 
	The difference between the “different truths” and the real truth is further complicated by Rathgeber who talks of the need for a “common truth” to create a single truth (Rathgeber 2000). However, a “common truth” will avoid other real truths which are not common to the various parties and would as such not create an accurate representation of the past abuses. It would therefore be futile to pursue the truth from the common truth perspective (Fischer and Petrović-Ziemer 2013).
	The question may be raised as to what type of truth a regional truth commission may provide if the ICTY has already established truth at a higher threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. According to Wilson, the facts established by the tribunal are a credible historical account (Wilson Richard Ashby 2005). However, there is a dichotomy between legal and historical truths. Whereas a truth commission establishes historical truths about an event, the tribunal is primarily 
concerned with the establishment of legal truth. Trials are not very good at documenting the whole truth about historical events (Koskenniemi 2002). Judicial establishment of the truth is also plagued with certain limitations, which require the need for non-judicial techniques to complement its efforts. Trials like the one in the ICTY are limited to the most notorious and easily identified cases, thus excluding other possible victims. Sometimes judicial techniques may be inadequate to address the personal and psychological experiences of victims. Such gaps may be filled in by non-judicial methods such as truth commissions. In the case of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber in the Kupreškić Judgement stated that the tribunal’s role was not to construct a historical account of the horrors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al 2000). It would be quite unfair to construct such a history without imputations from all the states in the region. Hence, a regional truth commission would be the best forum for an accurate historical account to be recorded in the West Balkans.

Location of Missing Persons and Closure
A regional truth commission in the Balkans will help locate missing persons not yet accounted for. This is a major goal, which RECOM intends to address (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 14 (b) and 13 (e)). It is the right of relatives of missing persons to know the whereabouts of their loved ones.  Over 40,000 persons went missing during the conflict in this region. In a 2011 report on the West Balkans by the ICRC, the number of people still reported missing in this region includes 9,309 in the Bosnia Herzegovina Conflict, 2,335 in the conflict in 
Croatia, and 1,795 in Kosovo (ICRC Annual Report 2011). A regional truth commission could give many families an opportunity for closure by determining the whereabouts of their loved ones. Representatives of the official commissions of missing persons have raised suspicion that this will have the effect of challenging and undermining their work (Fischer and Petrović-Ziemer 2013). However, their endeavours have been seriously challenged by politicization and lack of regional support even though their respective states have declared their commitment to searching for missing persons (Council for Europe 2012). Hence a regional commission will greatly help victims to know the fate of their relatives through a collective regional effort rather than a single national effort.

Recognition of Victims/Survivors
Recognition of victims/survivors is an advantage, which a regional truth commission would achieve. It is very important for the various states in the West Balkans to recognize the suffering of victims and acknowledge that there were victims on all sides. It is clear that a truth commission stimulates the recognition of victims (Huyse 2003). Huyse, however, raises the problem of gender inequality in the recognition of victims, especially the recognition of sexual violence, and submits that such denials may have adverse consequences on women’s economic position and structural marginalization. Even though the RECOM’s Proposed Statute broadly refers to sexual violence (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 10 (h)) it needs to specifically address gender-based crimes. More so, the recent happenings in the ICTY have not 
played in favour of the recognition of victims. The acquittals of KLA wartime commander Ramush Haradinaj and Croatian generals Mladen Mrkač and Ante Gotovina could only possibly be interpreted by the victims who have no legal understanding of the tribunal’s findings as a disregard for their suffering and losses during the war. Therefore, a regional truth commission will offer an avenue for such victims to be recognised. 
	Moreover, a regional truth commission would address more people and issues which have not been addressed by the ICTY and other attempted transitional justice mechanisms in the West Balkans. Being closer to the people, it will receive victims who could not travel to The Hague to testify and would allow all individuals in the region to become engaged in the process. It will research the political and situational forces that led to the outbreak of the wars to help prevent their recurrence. It would investigate and report the facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations to help the states acknowledge victims and move towards reconciliation.

Healing Therapy
A regional truth commission may also serve as a healing therapy for the victims and the communities in the former Yugoslavia by providing an avenue for victims and communities to tell their story. Rathgeber has submitted that “Bosnians are searching for a forum to tell their story, this is what is important to them, there is healing when a victim can tell their story” (Rathgeber 2000:30). Not only Bosnians are searching for this opportunity, but all other victims from various parts of the former Yugoslavia are looking for an avenue to tell their story and heal their mind. Political and legal issues mostly overshadow the victim’s voice in criminal proceedings. RECOM’s initiative, which is victim-oriented, will help project the voice of the victims and help the states to fill their pain and loss, and as such create a culture of empathy and solidarity with the victims. This may serve as a form of psychological healing to many victims. RECOM’s proposed Statute makes provision for psychological support and protection for those who tell their story (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 17 (9)).

Blame Apportioning
Another advantage of a regional truth commission in the Balkans is that it would help to apportion blame to the perpetrators and not to the ethnic group or society as a whole. This is a precondition for reconciliation since no group will be willing to absorb the entire blame for the atrocities that took place. This does not however rule out the fact that there should be a collective political recognition of the crimes that were committed on behalf of a particular group. 

Long Term National and Regional Reconciliation
A regional truth Commission in the West Balkans would facilitate national and regional reconciliation in the long term. The fact that the coalition for a regional truth commission avoids the word “reconciliation” in the name of the proposed regional truth-seeking commission avoids many problems and works to its advantage. Many victims may find it difficult to accept a Commission which projects reconciliation as its main message. RECOM prioritises uncovering the truth, searching for missing persons and the telling of victims’ stories. By doing so, the regional truth commission may achieve individual healing and reconciliation that may in the long term bring about national and regional healing and reconciliation. However as observed by Hayner (2001:252):
the degree to which the commission’s work contributes to long-term reconciliation, healing, and reform will be determined in large part by whether perpetuators or state officials acknowledge and apologise for wrongs, whether and how the commission’s report is distributed and put to use, and whether its core recommendations are implemented.
Hence a truth commission bears the potential to bring about national and regional healing and reconciliation as well as reconciliation among the various ethnic groups in the West Balkans.
	Truth commissions, by complementing the work of the ICTY, can help protect and promote the human rights situation in this region. Hayner argues that the overreaching goal of a truth commission is, in addition to preventing future violence, to prevent “human rights abuses in the future” (2001:252). Even though Mendeloff doubts the ability of a truth commission to improve the respect for human rights in a post-conflict state (2004), a truth commission it is argued would “forge the basis for a democratic political order that respects and protects human rights...”(Chapman 2009:5). One of the main reasons why the RECOM initiative is supported by the European Parliament is because it is hoped such an initiative will foster democracy and cooperation among states in the region. While it would be erroneous to attribute a country's improved human rights record solely to the work of a truth commission, the contributions which a truth commission may make should not be disregarded. 

Disadvantages of a Regional Truth-Seeking Mechanism in the West Balkans
The increasing use of truth commissions either as complementary to or as an alternative to criminal prosecution has come under immense criticism from both scholars and practitioners in transitional justice. There are substantial challenges that a regional truth commission in the Balkans would face in the field. 
	It has been observed that truth commissions deliver far less than they promise (Daly 2008). Despite the great hope that a regional truth commission could provide an accurate historical account of the conflict in this region, in reality, no regional truth commission can be expected to produce a single accurate account of a conflict which was quite complex and wide because the various truths upheld in the region “…are not only multivarious and subjective but also often mutually incompatible” (Daly 2008:26). But it can at least establish some historical account that can be agreed upon. Reports of truth commissions are “partially-constructed histories like any other” (Laakso 2003:50).
	Jonathan Temperman challenges the alleged potential of truth commissions and criticises their attempt to establish the truth as “a surprisingly elusive goal” (Temperman 2002:145). Indeed it would be fallacious to assume that there is a mathematical precision regarding the 
uniqueness of truth. While it may be possible to establish some truths about the conflict, an accurate and comprehensive truth would only be achieved after hearing from all the victims; an impossible task since some of the victims must have died with some of the truth, and the lapse of time renders the truth fragile. It becomes difficult to establish with mathematical precision not only the truth but the numbers of missing persons when statistics of the various actors involved do not agree. However, it will be worthwhile if a regional truth commission will be able to establish a set of truths (Phelps 2004:124) and locate some more missing persons.
	The truth may not offer healing to every victim. Most of the victims of the conflict who still live under impoverished socio-economic conditions may see a truth commission as too costly and a waste of time since it guarantees no healing to their physical impairment or low socio-economic status. The past may bear deep painful memories that some victims may choose to forget rather than relive the experience by testifying. The Statute Proposal of RECOM addresses this weakness by providing that “victims shall not be under obligation to give statements about their own suffering or the suffering of their family members” and provides psychological support for victims who do provide statements (The Statute Proposal of RECOM 2011: art. 17 (3) and (9)).
	Even if a regional truth commission may be able to provide emotional healing to many victims and determine the whereabouts of missing persons, it cannot bring about transmogrification of the various states in this region which will require institutional and political transformation. While the regional truth commission may be mandated to make recommendations from its process, the governments may not exercise the political will to implement the recommendations or the financial costs may be heavy for the government to undertake action. This problem which was experienced in South Africa frustrated victims and survivors who had great expectations from the recommendations made by the South African TRC.  There should as such be a realistic expectation of what a regional truth commission in the region can achieve.
	Indeed while post-conflict states have been eager to establish truth-seeking mechanisms, the lack of a safeguard for enforcement of the recommendations coming from such initiatives is one of the reasons why they create very little impact (McEvoy and Keiran 2010). The lack of an elaborate reparation scheme for victims is also a drawback to the initiative for a regional truth commission.
	Every transitional justice mechanism has been subject to criticism because of the deficiency that exists in their way of addressing the legacies of armed conflict. While the initiative for a regional truth commission appears very ambitious, it bears a very promising potential as a restorative measure to complement the work of the ICTY and contribute in building a harmonious, democratic and cooperative society in the West Balkans. This could be achieved if such a mechanism is well planned and strategically implemented while taking into account the contributions of other actors in the transitional justice process in the various states of the former Yugoslavia.

How the Recent Developments in the ICTY Affect the Regional Truth-Seeking Initiative in the West Balkans
The modus operandi of the ICTY has spurred heated debates on its impact to the transitional justice process in the former Yugoslavia. It was born out of the cry of the international community to manage the unmanageable atrocities in the Balkans (Arbour 2003). It has in many ways proved right the critics of criminal accountability as the most viable option in transitional justice and those who opine that criminal prosecution alone cannot address in totality the legacies of an armed conflict. While its proponents believe that the tribunal has contributed in strengthening the rule of law in this region, the recent developments in international criminal law regarding the former Yugoslavia have caused many to pay more attention to the prospects and potential advantages which a regional truth commission could offer as a complementary mechanism. 
	The ICTY’s four key verdicts in November 2012 sparked a chain reaction across the West and beyond. While the nationalists of those acquitted rejoiced and welcomed the verdicts, it quickly came under sustained attack by the media, political fragments, academic writers and other segments of the society in the West Balkans and beyond, bringing the ICTY to disrepute. The acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj was fiercely criticised by Serbian government officials who described it as a blow to international justice and the exercise of selective justice, and called on the tribunal to release all Serbs (EurActiv.com December 2012). Reporting for the New York Times, David Harland, a witness who lived through the siege of Sarajevo, also aimed a contentious argument of selective justice at the tribunal by stating that almost all Serbs have been found guilty while all the friends of the west have been acquitted (December 2012). He also claims, without putting forward any statistical evidence, that “more Serbs were displaced -ethnically cleansed-by the wars in the Balkans than any other community. And more Serbs remain ethnically displaced to this day,” and finally concludes that no one has been held to account for the crimes against Serbs. Similar accusations of selective justice were also made by the Russian Foreign Minister (Interfax.com 2012). However it is falsehood to claim that no one has been convicted by the ICTY for crimes against Serbs when the evidence of the convictions of Rasim Delic (Bosnian Commander), Enver Hadzihasanovic (Bosnian Commander), and Haradin Bala serve as reference points. But we have to agree with Osiel when he says “the criminal law fails to reach many people who bear significant moral responsibility for what transpired, while it reaches others whose measure of culpability seems far less” (Osiel 2000:125).
	It would seem that most of the criticisms, which were aroused by the ICTY’s three main acquittals stem from the critics’ perspective or notion of justice. It appears they define justice to mean the “victors' justice.” However, for a tribunal to effectively implement justice, it must ensure that the accused is given all the rights to a fair trial and due process. Acquittal would not in this sense mean no abuses have been committed but was probably because of some evidential or other procedural lapses. Such procedural or evidential complications are not typical of a truth commission. Hence a regional truth commission would offer better chances to the victim to obtain some form of justice. Advocates of truth-seeking initiatives admit that “to seek ‘truth’ without justice is transparently a partial, half-way measure” (Osiel 2000:134).
	The battle against the credibility of the ICTY partly led Vuk Jeremic, Serbian President at the UN General Assembly, to call for a debate on the issue of UN tribunals in April 2013. The debate was seen to be potentially inflammatory and against the transitional justice process in the region, and was boycotted by the USA, Canada and Jordan. In the debate which was described by Jeremic as the biggest debate in the history of the UN, Croatians used the opportunity to laud the efforts of the ICTY while Serbia saw it as an avenue to unleash Serbia’s hatred of the tribunal and strongly submitted that “ICTY trials will never reach the real truth, that is why the reconciliation will not be real and honest” (Marija 2013). The heated debate which saw the release of strong national interest and opinion is a powerful signal that the tribunal has contributed little to the transitional justice process in the region. 
	Beyond these arguments subsists the truth that the tribunal has faced serious challenges and criticisms in its attempt to employ criminal accountability as a mechanism to address the legacies of war in the West Balkans. More striking is the fact that politics and complex legal issues have silenced the voice of the victims who remain central in post-conflict resolution. At the above UN debate, a representative of a victim association was ejected from the meeting while trying to prove a point. This plays in favour of the prospects for a regional truth commission which will offer an avenue for the victims to be heard; to be at the centre of the process, rather than to be used as a tool to achieve criminal accountability which places the perpetrator at the centre of proceedings. 	
	The pain and suffering of victims will symbolically not be recognised by such acquittals of persons charged. The language understood by some ordinary citizen goes thus: No guilt, No Victim. The acquittal of Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač which was celebrated in Croatia may be understood by ordinary citizens in Serbia who have no knowledge of judicial decision-making to mean crimes committed against Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo never took place; hence, no victims.   
	More so, the witnesses who were used to prosecute Haradinaj, Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac (who were acquitted) will be re-traumatised and feel insecure, but a truth commission will be advantageous to them in this circumstance by helping to restore their sense of dignity. Such acquittals which have aroused criticisms are not unique to the ICTY. The Rwandan government suspended cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) when it felt that the tribunal’s (Appellate Chamber) release of a prominent accused was against the interest of victims, causing the Appellate to quickly reverse its own decision (Barayagwiza v Prosecutor  2000).
	One particular problem can be seen to ignite many other problems with the ICTY. This is its failure to establish an acceptable truth about the conflict and the abuses that took place in the former Yugoslavia. This underscores the limitation of criminal prosecution. As it is only limited to prosecuting the main perpetrators, the proceedings are not comprehensive enough to accommodate many perpetrators and victims who may assist the tribunal to create a balanced record of the events which would not appear selective or biased to a particular national group in the region. This makes the idea of a regional truth commission more appealing. Since it is a local initiative, with regional representation, it would help the states in the region overcome entrenched national group interests and to accept the truth derived from its findings as a way to resolve the on-going dispute and denial of certain atrocities that took place. 

Conclusion
The initiative for a regional truth commission in the West Balkans is greatly challenged by the political circumstances in the region. Experts will agree that it is better not to have a truth commission than to have a badly designed and implemented one (Hayner 2001). But there are no ideal conditions to establish a truth commission. The states in the region cannot simply hope for an ideal time for the creation of a regional truth commission. The political and civil society actors must negotiate for it within the context and constraints of their given environment. Achieving reconciliation in the West Balkans should be seen as a process not an end and a regional truth commission can contribute positively to that process. RECOM bears great potential to help the various national groups in the region accept the truth of the events that took place, determine the whereabouts of missing persons in the region, and promote healing, reconciliation and regional cooperation in the West Balkans. As the ICTY’s mandate ended in 2014, it is clear that the post-conflict problems in this region have not been effectively addressed by retributive justice that has sometimes even exacerbated them. With the ICTY having left mixed feelings of its verdicts in the minds of regional national groups, a regional truth commission would complement and continue the efforts to address the legacies of war in this region. The states in this region should as well exploit other means and methods of dealing with 
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^1	 	 Trials in the domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia have not been very successful. Apart from the lack of capacity and willingness to prosecute, cases are marred by witness intimidation, politicisation and double standards (see Zonglin, Katie. 2005. “The Future of War Crimes Prosecution in the Former Yugoslavia: Accountably of Junk Justice?.” Human Rights Quarterly 27:55-56.)
^2	 	 Other than Bosnia very little has been done as far as lustration and vetting is concerned in any state in the former Yugoslavia (see Hatschikjan et al., eds. 2005. Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans: A Project Documentation. Thessaloniki: Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.) Serbia adopted a Lustration law, which has not been implemented. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 24,000 police officers were vetted by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1999 and 2002. In 2002 and 2004, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council established by the Office of the High Representative vetted 1,000 judges and prosecutors. For details see Freeman, Mark. 2004. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: selected developments in transitional justice.” 12-14; Mayer-Rieckh,. 2008. “Vetting to prevent future abuses: reforming the police, courts, and prosecutors office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Pp. 181-220 in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, edited by Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff. New York: Columbia University Press.
^3	 	 Some truth Commissions (for example Sierra Leone and east Timor) expressly incorporated gender or sexual violence into their mandates. Others like in South Africa held gender hearings while some (Peru) created gender units.
^4	 	 It was a national commission set up to investigate a conflict which spread beyond its borders.  The commission had no regional representation and some of its commissioners had links with the former repressive regime. It ended within two years and never produced a single report.
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